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288 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002)
Hunt v. Lee
291 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Facts
A. Wiggins
On September 17, 1988, Florence Lacs ("Lacs") was found dead in her
bathtub.' Kevin Wiggins ("Wiggins") was doing construction work on Lacs's
apartment building at the time of her murder. On the afternoon of September
15, 1988, Wiggins returned to the work site after his boss had released him for
the day.2 A neighbor of Lacs saw Wiggins near Lacs's apartment around the time
she likely was killed?. Later that evening, Wiggins picked up his girlfriend,
Geraldine Armstrong ("Armstrong"), in Lacs's car. Wiggins and Armstrong
went shopping with Lacs's credit cards and pawned one of Lacs's rings. Six days
later, Wiggins and Armstrong were pulled over driving Lacs's car.4
In a nonjury trial, Wiggins was convicted of the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder of Lacs, two counts of theft, and one count of robbery?
In his ruling, the judge stated that the convictions were based on a weighing of
all the presented evidence.6 At the sentencing hearing on the murder conviction,
Wiggins's attomeyargued that Wiggins had not committed the murder. The only
mitigating evidence Wiggins's attorney presented was that Wiggins had no prior
violent convictions.7 The jury found that Wiggins was a principal in the first
degree on the murder count and sentenced him to death under Article 27,
Section 412 of the Maryland Code.' The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed
1. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629,632 (4th Or. 2002).
2. Id at 633.
3. Id The time of Lacs's death was not established to a reasonable medical certainty. The
testimony of Lacs's friends also created some uncertainty as to who last saw or spoke to Lacs and
what she had been wearing. Id at 639.
4. Id at 634.
5. Wiggins v. State, 597 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Md. 1991).
6. Wgn, 288 F.3d at 635.
7. Id
8. Id; see MD. CODE ANN., RIMES & PUNISHMENS S 412 (1996) (setting forth the
sentencing procedure and available sentences for murder convictions). In order to show that the
defendant was a principal in the first degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was the actual perpetrator of the murder WOi, 288 F.3d at 635 n.2.
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his conviction and sentence.9
In his application for state post-conviction relief, Wiggins claimed that his
attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present mitigating evidence
at the sentencing hearing. Wiggins alleged that his social history should have
been presented to the jury." The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected this
claim and affirmed his conviction and sentence.1 Wiggins filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C S 2254 in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. 2 The district court found that the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland unreasonably applied Jadkscn v Vigiza" to Wiggins's guilt
claims.14 Relying heavilyon WUiam vii Taior, s the district court also found that
Wiggins's attorney provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by
failing to investigate and present the mitigating evidence of Wiggins's social
history.16  The district court vacated Wiggins's conviction and sentence and
ordered that Wiggins be released from the murder charge."7 The State of Mary-
land appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Grcuit. s
B. Hunt
On September 9, 1984, Henry Lee Hunt ("Hunt") killed Jackie Ransom
("Ransom") in exchange for a payment of $2,000 from Dottie Ransom, the
victim's wife, and Dottie Ransom's other husband, Rogers Locklear.19 The next
day, Hunt heard that Lany Jones ("Jones") told the police that Hunt killed
Ransom. On September 14, 1984, Hunt and two other men drove Jones to an
isolated spot and shot him several times. Jones was still alive when they dragged
him out of the truck, so Hunt shot him in the head."
9. WWin, 597 A.2d at 1367.
10. Wi , 288 F.3d at 635. Wigins alleged that the history of physical and sexual abuse
that he suffered and the low level of his IQ should have been presented to the jury. Id at 640.
11. Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1, 16 (Md. 1999).
12. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D.Md. 2001); 28 US.C 5 2254 (2000) (setting
forth evidentiaryrequirements for a wri of habeas corpus; part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996).
13. 443 US. 307 (1979).
14. W42sn,288 F3d at 638 n.5;seJacksonv. Virginia,443US.307,321(1979) (holding that
a defendant isenitled to S 2254 habeas relief if no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt based upon the evidence adduced at triaD.
15. 529 US. 362 (2000).
16. Wig , 164 F. Supp. 2d at 558; seWrfliams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,396 (2000) (conclud-
ing that defense counsels failure to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing consti-
tuted ineffective assistance).
17. W irE, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
18. Wz im, 288 F.3d at 629.
19. Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 286-87 (4th ar. 2002). Dottie Ransom married Jackie




A jury convicted Hunt of the capital murders of Ransom and Jones. 1 At
the sentencing hearing, Hunt's attorney presented no mitigating evidence.22 In
his closing argument, Hunt's attorney attempted to convince the jury not to
impose a death sentence bydescribing the death penalty as a cruel and immoral
punishment." The jury sentenced Hunt to death on both counts of capital
mul-der.
24
Hunt filed a post-conviction Motion for Appropriate Relief in North
Carolina state court. He requested relief based on a number of violations of the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions. The state court rejected
Hunt's claims andthe Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Hunt's petition
for a writ of certiorari.2' The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.27
Hunt filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under S 2254 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.2 He claimed
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the guilt and sentencing phases
and that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v
Mar)1xd 29 The district court granted the State summary judgment on all of
Hunt's claims. Hunt appealed to the Fourth Qrtuit.
II. Hddig
The Fourth Crcuit held that the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision
denying Wiggins's Jadkscn and ineffective assistance of counsel claims was
reasonable and reversed the district court's order vacating his conviction and
sentence. 1 On similar grounds, the Fourth Circuit found that the North Caro-
lina state court reasonably rejected Hunt's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and affirmed the district court's decision. 2
21. Id
22. Id Hunt's attorney investigated mitigating evidence but found that each piece of
mitigating evidence was outweighed bydamaging evidence that could come out on cross-examina-
tion or in rebuttal. Id at 290-92.
23. Id at 292-93.
24. Id at 287.
25. Hwu 291 F.3d at 288.
26. See g dy North Carolina v. Hunt, 485 SE.2d 304 (N.C 1997) (denying certioran);
North Carolina v. Hunt, 447 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1994) (denying certioran).
27. See gmadly Hunt v. North Carolina, 522 US. 861 (1997) (denying certiora).
28. Hwrt, 291 F.3d at 288. SegarU!y28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000).
29. Hwrt, 291 F.3d at 288; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the
prosecution's suppression of exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment violates
a defendant's right to due process).
30. Him, 291 F.3d at 286.
31. Wi im, 288 F.3d at 643.





In their petitions for habeas relief under 5 2254, Wiggins and Hunt both
contended that their attorneys' failures to present mitigating evidence at their
sentencing hearings constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." When the
Fourth Grcuit reviewed the state courts' applications of Strixkandv Washij" 4
it applied S 2254's "contraryto" and "unreasonable application" standards." The
"contrary to" standard of S 2254 requires a defendant to show that the state
court either arrived at a conclusion of law opposite to that found bythe Supreme
Court on a question of law or made a decision opposite to that of the Supreme
Court on materially indistinguishable facts. 6 Under the "unreasonable applica-
tion" standard, a court may grant habeas relief if the state court applied the
correct legal principle, but unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the
defendant's case.
37
As both Wiggins and Hunt attempted to use Wiam as support for their
ineffective assistance claims, the Fourth Crcuit comprehensively distinguished
Wdliam from the facts of Wt&pi and Hwt 3  In Wzl/iam, the United States
Supreme Court found that Williams received ineffective assistance at his sentenc-
ing hearing because his counsel completely failed to investigate or present
mitigating evidence.39 Wiggins alleged that his counsel should have presented
evidence of his social history to the jury.' The Fourth Crcuit found that
Wiggins's counsel was aware of Wiggins's social history and that this knowledge
allowed his counsel to consider all possible strategies for Wiggins's sentencing
33. Wgirz, 288 F.3d at 635-36; Hwn, 291 F.3d at 288; sw 28 U.S.C S 2254.
34. 466 US. 668 (1984).
35. Wz& lax, 288 F3d at 639; Hwt, 291 F.3d at 289-90; 28 U.S.C S 2254(d). Section 2254
reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to anyclai
ofat vs ate& on the merits in State court proceedings unless . addication
(1 resulted in a decision that was contrAryto, or involved an unreasonable aplication
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court of te United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
m light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C S 2254(d); s Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in order
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must showthat counsel's performance was
deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant).
36. Wdlim, 529 U.S. at 405.
37. Wir, 288 F.3d at 636; sw 28 U.S.C 5 2254(d)(1).
38. Wigin, 288 F.3d at 640, Hwrr, 291 F.3d at 292; see UVdiam, 529 US. at 362.
39. Wzdhe, 529 US. at 395.
40. Wlbnz, 288 F.3d at 639-40.
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hearing."' The Fourth Crcuit concluded that Wiggins's counsel made an in-
formed decision, and thus the district court's finding that Wilam supported
vacating Wiggins's sentence was improper.42
In Hum, the court found that Hunt's counsel performed a reasonably
thorough investigation into possible mitigating evidence for Hunt's sentencing
hearing." After his investigation, he did not present any mitigating evidence
because he thought that it was outweighed bythe damage it could cause on cross-
examination or in rebuttal." The Fourth Circuit found that Hunt's attorney, like
Wiggins's, made an informed decision afterweighing available strategies, and thus
provided effective assistance at the sentencing hearing." The Fourth Circuit
noted in both W;Soz and Hwtthat Wi/iam did not create aperse rule that failure
to present mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.'
After a factual inquiry, the Fourth Circuit concluded that defense counsel
in Wzgn and Hwrprovided reasonable representation, and thus the state courts
had not unreasonably applied Sri&/lrl 47 This application of the correct law in
a reasonable manner led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that the state courts in
Wi'n and Ht did not come to decisions "contraryto" the applicable law, nor
did they unreasonably apply the applicable law. The Fourth Circuit held that
neither Wiggins nor Hunt met the requirements for habeas relief under S 2254.48
B. Isse in Wggins
The State of Maryland argued that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
reasonably appliedJa&sonto Wiggins's insufficiencyof evidence claim, and thus
the district court's grant of habeas relief was not supported by S 2254.9 Jackson
states that when addressing sufficiency of evidence claims, a court should ask
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt."" The Fourth Circuit looked to the facts found by
the trial judge and concluded that the Court of Appeals of Maryland's application
ofJadkscnwas reasonable under S 2254."' The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of habeas relief.52
41. Id at 641.
42. Id
43. Hung 291 F.2d at 290-92.
44. Id at 292.
45. Id
46. W,z, 288 F.3d at 640-41; Hu, 291 F.3d at 292.
47. W'ins, 288 F.3d at 641-42; Hut, 291 F.3d at 292; sStyiarA, 466 U.S. at 690-91.
48. Wggns, 288 F.3d at 643; Hun, 291 F.3d at 292; se 28 US.C 5 2254.
49. Wg zgi, 288 F.3d at 637-39; se28 US.C S 2254.
50. Wqz, 288 F.3d at 637 (quotingJaesm, 443 US. at 319).
51. Id at 639; se28 US.C S 2254.
52. Wgni, 288 F.3d at 639.
2002]
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C Isses in Hmt
1. C64A gwwn±
Hunt claimed that his counsel's closing argument constituted ineffective
assistance. His defense counsel made an argument based upon the immorality
and "barbaric nature" of the death penaltyin an effort to convince the "one juror
whose conscience would not permit a finding of death" to vote for life. 3 The
Fourth Circuit found that the immorality and irrevocable nature of the death
penaltywere common themes in closing arguments of capital sentencing hearings
and were not in violation of North Carolina law. 4 In this closing argument,
Hunt's attomeyalso acknowledged the existence of aggravating factors in Hunt's
case."5 Hunt alleged that by recognizing the existence of aggravating factors and
presenting no mitigating evidence, the jury was forced to impose a death sen-
tence. 6 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that Section 2000(b)(3) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina gave the jury discretion as to "whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the State's prison
for life." 7 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Hunt's attomeymade an informed
strategic decision regarding his closing argument, and that it did not constitute
ineffective assistance5?
2. Suppnsion fE'tidee
At trial, Hunt's girlfriend testified that Hunt had threatened to killJones for
"running his mouth" about the Ransom murder to the police. Hunt claimed that
the State violated Brady bysuppressing notes frompolice interviews with Jones.
These notes revealed that Jones did not tell the police that Hunt killed Ransom.
Hunt argued that these notes were exculpatory because they showed that he did
not kill Ransom and that he had no motive to kill Jones.6° Hunt also argued that
these notes could have been used to impeach the testimony of Hunt's girlfriend
because they showed that Jones was not in fact "running his mouth."61 The
Fourth Carcuit discounted these arguments, stating that the relevant issue was
whether Hunt believed that Jones was telling the police that Hunt killed
Ransom. 62 The court found that there was ample evidence suggesting Hunt's
53. Hwrt, 291 F.3d at 293-94.
54. Id at 294-95 (citing North Carolina v. Barrett, 469 S.E2d 888, 899 (N.C 1996)).
55. Id at 293.
56. Id
57. Id; N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(b)(3) (2001).
58. Hw, 291 F.3d at 295.
59. Id; seeBrad 373 U.S. at 87.





belief that Jones was talking to the police.6 This belief established a motive
regardless of whether Jones actually reported Hunt to the police." The Fourth
Ciruit found Hunt's Brady argument to be without merit and affirmed the
district court's denial of habeas relief.
65
IV. Appli v in Vnza
A. Wiggins
In Maryland, a defendant can be found guilty of first degree murder based
upon accomplice liability." Under Article 27, Section 413 of the Maryland Code,
the jury must find that the defendant was the actual slayer- the jury must find
"principalship"- in order for the defendant to be death eligible.61 In effect, if
the trial proof leaves any doubt that the defendant was a principal in the first
degree,'at the sentencing hearing the defense has available the argument that the
defendant was not the actual slayer. Defense counsel may reasonably decide to
assert that the defendant was not a principal in the first degree rather than
presenting mitigating evidence. In Virginia, in contrast, a defendant who has
been convicted of capital murder alreadyhas been found to be a principal in the
first degree."' Therefore, defense counsel does not have the strategic choice of
arguing that the defendant was not the "triggerman" or of presenting mitigating
evidence. Defense counsel in Virginia have a heavier dutyto investigate possible
avenues of mitigation because no alternative strategy for the sentencing hearing
exists.
Wz&im also addresses the level of counsel's responsibility to investigate
possible mitigating evidence on a defendant's behalf. The Fourth Orcuit found
that, despite his minimal investigation, Wiggins's defense counsel was aware of
all possible mitigation strategies and this knowledge adequately protected
Wiggins's rights. 69 The court found that counsel is not ineffective so long as he
makes an "informed strategic choice."' This standard does not require a com-
prehensive investigation of every avenue of mitigation.
B. Hunt
Hunt's counsel did not present mitigating evidence at Hunt's sentencing
hearing because damaging evidence could then come forth in rebuttal or on




66. Se MD. CODE ANN., QUMES &PUNISHMENTS S 407 (1996).
67. Sw MD. CODE ANN., CYRTES &PUNISHMENM S 413(e)(1) (1996).
68. Sw VA CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie Supp. 2002).




impoverished and violent childhood, a relationship with his children, and a good
employment record. Defense counsel's inability to present mitigating evidence
caused the jury to consider only the prosecution's aggravating evidence.
In a Virginia capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution can present evi-
dence of past criminal convictions and other unadjudicated bad acts if it seeks
death on future dangerousness grounds!71 Most of the damaging rebuttal evi-
dence feared byHunt's attomeywould, in a Virginia case, be part of the Common-
wealth's case-in-chief. Thus, a Virginia capital defense attorney would not face
the dilemma Hunt's attorney faced. Defense attorneys can present mitigating
evidence without considering whether the evidence is outweighed bythe damage
that it could cause on cross-examination or in rebuttal. This allows defense
counsel greater freedom to present mitigating evidence on behalf of the defen-
dant. The jurycan make its determination of life or death after considering a full
presentation of both the aggravating and mitigating evidence.
V. QCdwibn
In Wi &r and Hut, the Fourth Crcuit simplified the necessary analysis for
ineffective assistance claims based upon counsel's failure to present mitigating
evidence.' If defense counsel decides not to present mitigating evidence, and
this decision is based on a reasonable investigation or other knowledge of the
defendant's situation, then the Fourth CGrcuit stated that the Stn&id/apresump-
tion of adequate representation applies, and the court will presume that counsel's
decision was part of a reasonable trial strategy.3 This presumption can be
overcome, as it was in W miam, but counsel must be shown to have provided
unreasonablyineffective assistance.' However, the United States Supreme Court
granted Wigins's petition for a writ of certiorari on November 18,2002 and the
Fourth Crcuit's decision could be overtued.7'
Kristen F. Grunewald
71. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Mchie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Vlichie
2000).
72. Sw W&gon, 288 F.3d at 639-43; Hwz 291 F.3d at 289-95.
73. See Wgin, 288 F.3d at 639-40; Hnt, 291 F.3d at 289-90, 292.
74. Sw W'diim, 529 US. at 399; Wins, 288 F.3d at 640-42.
75. Wiggins v. Corcoran, No. 02-311, 2002 WL 31018395, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002).
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